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Disaggregated Welfare Effects of Agricultural Price Policies 
in Urban Indonesia 
Helen H. Jensen 1 and Justo Manrique2 
Introduction 
Historically, the Government of Indonesia (GOI) has intervened both directly and 
indirectly to control and stabilize prices in the country's food markets. It has intervened 
directly in rice markets by setting floor and ceiling prices and indirectly by subsidizing 
input prices. For corn, which is the main input used by the country's growing, modern 
poultry industry, the GOI has intervened by investing resources in research (for nonrice 
staples and secondary crops), by maintaining floor prices, and by subsidizing prices 
paid by feed mills (20). 
In recent years, the GOI (like the governments of many other developing countries, 
has cut back public expenditures to reduce the increasing fiscal deficit caused by its 
intervention policies. The partial or total elimination of input and food subsidies and 
increases in foodstuff prices included in the reforms were price adjustments likely to 
have variable effects on consumers, because behavioral parameters with respect to 
consumption differ across socio-economic classes. Recent studies of the food situa-
tion in developing countries have demonstrated convincingly that income distribution, 
as well as relative prices, play a crucial role in determining food consumption and 
related levels of hunger and malnutrition (1 , 6, 7, 9, 10, 11 ). 
The price effects of changes in food and agricultural policies have created the need 
for consistent methodologies, not only to monitor the disaggregated welfare effects of 
such adjustments, but also to cope with the possible need for compensation schemes 
that are sound in fiscal terms and effective in their impact on the poor. Unfortunately, 
such methodologies generally are not used. 
Traditional welfare analysis of price policy changes usually considers all consumers 
as a group and uses the notion of consumer surplus (an exact measure of consumer 
welfare only in restrictive instances). For instance, Reutlinger and Knapp (15) used 
this concept to evaluate the effects of different trade and stock policies on consumers 
in food deficit countries. Von Braun and Haen (22) analyzed the effects of price and 
market intervention policies on the welfare of consumers and producers using producer 
and consumer surplus measures in Egypt. Scandizzo and Bruce (17) proposed a 
simplified form of a partial equilibrium methodology derived from the theory of consu-
mer and producer surplus to measure agricultural price intervention effects. Later, 
Soe et al. (18) used Scandizzo and Bruce's approach to evaluate the effects of taxing 
rice exports and subsidising rice consumption on producers and consumers' welfare 
in Myanmar (Burma). 
312 
Focusing on all consumers as a group is neither effective nor useful if policy makers 
are concerned with the effects of these adjustments on the well-being of specific target 
groups. Any generalization to these target groups that uses demand parameters 
estimated in aggregate could be erroneous and misleading. 
Estimation of demand systems for different socio-economic groups yields the appro-
priate parameters because it is difficult to incorporate income distributional effects into 
demand analysis and because unbiased and consistent structural demand parameters 
are needed for groups following different underlying behaviors. When behaviors differ 
by income levels, the effects of income distribution can ~e allowed for by subdividing 
consumers into income or socio-economic groups and estimating the behaviors of 
these groups separately (5, 12, 13, 14). Specific demand parameters of an income 
group that are estimated in this way can be used to evaluate accurately the effects of 
alternative price policies on the well-being of the different groups and to design specific 
target group compensation schemes (such as a food price subsidy or food assistance) 
(1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 16, 21 ). Jn sum, consistent methodologies for assessing policy 
effects on consumers should include classification of the population into appropriate 
income classes, estimation of demand parameters for each income class, and welfare 
analysis based on estimated behavioral parameters. 
The general objective of this paper is to present a theoretically sound methodology 
that could be used to measure welfare-level changes caused by the adoption of 
alternative food-price policies. This paper has three specific objectives: 1) to develop 
a methodology classifying households by income groups; 2) to analyze expenditure 
patterns for different income groups; and 3) to evaluate specific welfare effects of 
selected price policies on different income groups. 
1. The data and classification of households by income groups 
1.1 Data issues 
Data from the National Social and Economic Surveys (SUSENAS) of households in 
Indonesia were used in this study. The surveys from 1981 , 1984, and 1987 provide 
the data basic to this study. The information on individual tiouseholds was aggregated 
within each primary sampling unit (PSU) to obtain a "representative" household. 
Because the SUSENAS surveys in 1984 and 1987 were performed in spring only, 
subround one (Spring) from SUSENAS 1981 was used to avoid possible seasonal 
bias. 
The "average" or representative household per PSU was constructed by dividing the 
aggregate levels of some selected variables (demographic and total expenditures) by 
the number of households in that PSU. These representative average households per 
PSU were the units of observation for this study and are hereafter referred to as 
"households". 
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Only the observations belonging to the urban regions, both on and off Java, were 
analyzed. In total , there were 3705 observations for the urban population on and off 
Java for the three time periods. 
1 .2 Classification of households by income groups 
Differences in household behavior in the acquisition of goods, as expressed by 
differences in income and household characteristics, was the fundamental criterion 
behind this classification. Households showing similar consumption behaviors were 
classified as the same income group. 
For low-income households, food expenditures are explained almost completely by 
income. For high-income households, food expenditures also depend upon other 
factors such as household demographic characteristics (ages of household members, 
race, religion, education , health, employment status, geographic location, etc). For 
these households, the part of expenditures not explained by income is more likely to 
vary. In other words, when estimating food expenditures as explained by income and 
some of these household characteristics (Engel relations), the values of the disturban-
ces are likely to be small for low-income households and large for high-income 
households. 
The method for classifying households into income groups was based on an analysis 
of homogeneity of variances of residuals from these Engel regressions. The procedure 
includes two basic steps: estimation of Engel relations, and tests for homoskedasticity 
of variances. 
1.2.1 Estimation of Engel relations 
The objective of the estimation was to obtain residuals of sample observations from 
Engel regressions. First, an Engel function of the form 
Ei = CXiO REGION+ CXi1 AS1 + CXi2 AS2 + CXi3 AS3 + CXi4 AS4 
+ CXi5 AS5 + CXi6 AS6 + CXi7 TOTEXP + µi 
i =foods, non foods, fish, fruits, vegetables, eggs 
µj - iid (0, Vi2) 
(1) 
was estimated for years 1981, 1984, and 1987, independently, where Ei is expenditu-
res in commodity group i; REGION is a dummy variable (Java= 1, Off Java= O); AS1 
is the average number of children 1-5 years of age per household; AS2 is the average 
number of children 5-10 years of age per household; AS3 is the average number of 
males 10-20 years of age per household; AS4 is the average number of females 10-20 
years of age per household; AS5 is the average number of males 20 years and older 
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per household; AS6 is the average number of females 20 years and older per 
household; and TOTEXP is the total expenditure per household. 
Then, for each regression, these parameter estimates were used to calculate the 
corresponding residuals. 
1.2.2 Tests for homoskedasticity of variances 
Successive Goldfeld-Quandt tests using the residuals from step 1 were performed in 
order to classify observations into groups having different variances. Households were 
classified into income groups by setting income boundaries for groups of residuals. 
The Goldfeld-Quandt test is based on the idea that, if sample observations have been 
generated under the conditions of homoskedasticity, or if the null hypothesis 
Ho : <112 = 022 = ... = om2 (m :-:::; n), 
is true (where n is the number of observations and m is the number of groups), then 
the variance of the disturbances of one part of the sample observations is the same 
as the variance of the disturbances of another part of the observations. Thus a test 
for homoskedasticity becomes simply a test for the equality of two variances. Moreo-
ver, because under Ho, each sample variance has a chi-square distribution divided by 
the number of degrees of freedom, their ratio has an F distribution, provided the two 
sample variances are independent. The requirement that the two sample variances 
be independent means that two separate regression equations must be estimated--
one for each part of the sample observations. Then, the test statistic is 
where s;2 is the variance for sample i, and where n; is the number of observations in 
sample i. 
Equation (1) was reestimated independently for each group of observations identified 
as having homogeneous variance. The tests were perfonned to see if the variances 
of the residuals of each adjacent pair of groups of observations were the same. If they 
were, then the observations in both groups were said to belong to the same income 
group. If they were not the same (i.e., they were statistically different at a= .05), then 
the observations in each group were said to belong to different income groups. 
Precise final boundaries were determined for every income group by repeating the 
Goldfeld-Quandt tests for smaller groups of residuals in the neighbourhood of two 
adjacent groups. This process was repeated for each survey. Then, the income 
groups were reconciled so that the same number of groups existed for each year. Final 
income groups were found by grouping the corresponding yearly income classes. 
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The 3705 observations for urban zones reported in the 198 
SUSENAS surveys were distributed, following this methodoloc 
groups: low, medium-low, medium-high, and high. 
1.3 Food participation rates 
1984, and 1987 
into four income 
The percentage of sampled representative households reporting e d1tures on food 
groups assists in identifying the most frequently accessed food grot. for cacti income 
group and identifies the extent of the problem of zero expenditure· or the subsequent 
econometric analysis. Low-income households had low particip. ro mies for meats 
(68 %}, dairy products (48 %} and some (under 50 %} palawija pr t'> , high-income 
groups showed high participation rates for almost all commodit· c oups. Rice was 
consumed by nearly all households, regardless of income level. 
2. Analytical framework 
2.1 Some duality results 
When consumer behavior is specified, the cost function is the 
problem 
c (p ,u } = min p' q s. t. u(q) = u ,(2) 
lion to the dual 
where c(p ,u ·) is the cost function, p is a vector of prices and q a vector of quantities. 
In this paper, we will use the cost function belonging to the PIGLOG family associated 
with the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Deaton and Muellbauer (3) approxi-
mate the cost function of the PIGLOG class with the following cost function, which is 
defined as flexible functional form 
8 
In c = (X 0 + L (X j In p j + % L L y jk In Pj In Pk+ u ~ 0 n Pj p j. (3) 
j=1 j=1 1<=1 
2.2 Welfare measures 
Exact measures of welfare change can be described in terms of the cost function: 
index numbers are based on ratios of the cost function under different price regimes, 
and compensating and equivalent variation are based on differences in the values of 
the cost function evaluated at different sets of prices and fixed utility levels. Marshallian 
consumer surplus is exact only under special conditions. 
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o measure welfare changes associated with price changes, we use the compensating 
ariation measure (CV;). Formally, 
CV; = c(Ui0,p;1) - c(u;O,piO) i=1, ... ,4,(4) 
vhere 
J10 = original utility level for the ith income group, 
p;O = original mean price vector for the ith income group, and 
Pi1 =new mean price vector for the ith income group. 
Because the Hicksian demand functions are the derivatives of the cost function, 
integration also gives the difference in costs of reaching the same level of well-being 
two different price situations. Then, 
Po 
CV = - ( x1 (p,u0) dp; + •m .(5) 
p 1 i 
Thus, to estimate the CVs by income group, we first estimate the original utility levels 
for each income group by using the duality result and the cost function (2). 
Then, 
CV= - {
0 I Xi (p, u0) dp; + 6 m 
p1 
Finally, the CVs for each income group are determined using equation (4). 
8 
(5) 
uo = [lnC -(ao+ L, ailnPj+%.L, I, YjklnPjlnPk)J/PoDPjpi (6) 
j=1 j=1 lc=1 
For instance, Huang (4) approximated the compensating variation measure as a 
function of all price changes and compensated price elasticities obtained from estima-
ted inverse and ordinary demand systems, to measure the effects of the U.S. meat 
trade on consumers' welfare. 
3. Results and discussion 
Demand parameters of a linearized AIDS (LAIOS) system estimated using the 
SUSENAS data were used to characterize the structure of the underlying cost functions 
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for each income group. The general form of the derived share equations of this system 
for all income groups was 
w, = p10 + l:s Pis Ns + Lj l'ij In Pj + Pi In (XI P*), (7) 
where the Ns are the demographic variables (s = 1, ... , d) and i,j = 1, ... ,n. 
Detailed derivations of the system are available in Deaton and Muellbauer (3). 
The existence of a problem of zero expenditures in meats and/or milk for some 
low-income households conditioned the methodology for the estimation of the demand 
system for this group. Low-income households were divided into four groups, or 
regimes, based upon the outcomes of the discrete choices of consumption of meat 
and dairy products: those consuming (i) all commodities; (ii) all except meat; (iii) all 
except dairy; and (iv) all except meat and dairy. Endogenous switching among the 
four regimes can occur when individuals are not randomly assigned to each regime. 
Endogenous switching regression techniques were used to obtain unbiased and 
consistent LAIOS demand parameter estimates. Then, conditional LAIOS, including 
estimates of self-selection terms to correct for selectivity bias, were estimated for each 
of these subsamples of low-income households. 
Finally, for estimation purposes, the price index P was approximated using Stone's 
index, 
(8) 
where Wi is the mean of the budget share. Also, the basic demand restrictions 
(adding-up, homogeneity, and symmetry) were imposed in the estimation. The esti-
mated own-price and income elasticities for all income groups are reported in Table 1. 
The results from a static simulation exercise to measure welfare losses for each income 
group under different pricing policies show the application of the procedures. These 
pricing strategies include changes in prices of commodity groups for which the GOI 
intervenes directly or indirectly in fixing consumer prices (rice, meats, and dairy 
products) and changes in prices of commodity groups consumed mainly by low-income 
households (rice and fish). 
3.1 Welfare losses under alternative single price increases 
The analysis of single commodity price increases involved independent increases of 
10 % in the prices of rice, dairy products, fish , and meats. The resu lts of this exercise 
are shown in Table 2. Clearly, households in different income groups were affected 
differently by commodity price increases. 
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Table 1: Marshallian own price and expenditure elasticities of rice, dairy pro-
ducts, fish and meats for different income groups in urban Indonesia 
Mean total 
Income expend. Rice Dairy Fish 
Group (rupiahs) Own Exp Own Exp Own 
High 189891.3 -.42 .26 -.74 .70 -.SO 
Med-high 821S6.1 -.58 .10 -.64 .71 -.66 
Med-low 49132.9 -.87 .15 -.SS .23 -.63 
Low l a 28S66.4 -.71 .34 -.29 .84 -.84 
Low 2b 23930.4 -1 .59 .10 -.S3 
Low3c 2S443.8 -1.67 .71 .33 .34 -.63 
Low4d 20302.6 -.98 .31 -.48 
a Low 1 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
b Low 2 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products = 0. 
c Low 3 = subsample share of meats= 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
d Low 4 =subsample share of meats = 0, and share of dairy products = 0. 
Meats 
Exp Own Exp 
.22 -.89 .69 
-.82 -.91 .25 
-.34 -.81 -.8S 
.16 -.53 .39 
.70 -.91 .65 
.98 
.S8 
Table 2: Differential welfare changes caused by a single increase of 10 % in the 
prices of rice, dairy products, fish and meats 
Income Mean total 
Group expend. Rice Dairy Fish 
rupiahs 
High 189891.3 -447.9 -157.2 -190.3 
Medium-high 821S6.1 -498.2 -76.0 -128.1 
Medium-low 49132.9 -S20.5 -SS.2 -123.9 
Low 18 28S66.4 -375.6 -23.S -129.0 
Low2b 23930.4 -1368.1 - 1S3.2 
Low3c 2S443.8 -S99.5 -64.6 -124.1 
Low4d 20302.6 -942.2 - -234.2 
a Low 1 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products > o. 
b Low 2 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
c Low 3 = subsample share of meats = 0, and share of dairy products > o. 
d Low 4 = subsample share of meats= 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
Meats 
-246.7 
-163.8 
-103.3 
-59.4 
-84.0 
-
-
The resulting consumer welfare losses for every income group depended upon the 
commodity price changed. An increase of 10 % in the price of rice caused the greatest 
welfare loss tor any income group, and an increase of 1 O % in the price of dairy products 
caused the smallest. An increase of 10 % in the price of meats caused the second 
greatest welfare loss for the high-income groups; an increase of 1 O % in the price of 
fish caused the second-largest welfare loss tor the lowest income group. 
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The low-income groups were the most affected and the high-income groups the least 
affected by an increase in the price of rice. On average, the welfare loss for the 
medium-low income households was about 1.9 times the loss for the high-income 
households. If we consider not only what these losses represent in terms of mean 
total expenditures, but also that rice expenditures were the largest food expenditures 
in the budgets of the medium-low and the low-income households, then we can 
conclude that low-income households were most affected by price increases for rice. 
An increase in the price of dairy products affected high-income households the most 
and low-income households the least. 
3.2 Welfare losses under alternative multiple price increases 
Other pricing scenarios involving joint increases of 10 % in the prices of rice and dairy 
products, rice and fish, and rice and meats illustrate the effects of multiple price 
increases. The results from this exercise are shown in Table 3. As for single price 
increases, it is clear that the welfare of households in different income groups was 
affected differently by these multiple price increases. 
Table 3: Differential welfare changes caused by a multiple increase of 10 % in 
the prices of rice-dairy products, rice-fish and rice-meats 
Income Mean total 
Group expend. RiceDairy Rice-Fish 
rupiahs 
High 189891 .3 -604.3 -639.4 
Medium-high 82156.1 -574.1 -629.7 
Medium-low 49132.9 -576.6 -647.5 
Low 1a 28566.4 -398.8 -507.8 
Low 2b 23930.4 - -1530.5 
Low 3c 25443.8 
-663.9 -722.2 
Low 4d 20302.6 
- -1187.9 
a Low 1 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
b Low 2 = subsample share of meats > 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
c Low 3 = subsample share of meats = 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
d Low 4 = subsample share of meats = 0, and share of dairy products > 0. 
Rice-Meats 
-689.7 
-663.6 
-627.7 
-431.9 
-1456.1 
-
-
When we consider not only what these losses represent in terms of the mean total 
expenditures but also the relative decrease in welfare from single to multiple price 
changes, then we can see that low-income households were relatively more affected 
than were high-income households by these multiple price increases: the additional 
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welfare losses for the low-income households were much larger than the additional 
welfare losses for the high-income households. 
On average, the welfare losses for the high-income households were about 1.4 and 
2.2 times the loss for the low-income households with the multiple price changes. The 
welfare losses for high-income households were about 7 times those for the low-inco-
me households, when single price increases occurred. 
4. Policy implications 
These results have important implications for the development of food policies. First, 
if the policymaker's objective is to protect the welfare of low-income households, then 
any increase in the price of rice without an adequate compensation scheme would be 
the most harmful policy choice to the poor. 
Second, related to increased meat prices (and dairy prices, both results of higher input 
prices), we showed that low-income households would be minimally affected by an 
increase in the price of meat or dairy products. High-income households would be 
most affected and, alternatively, would benefit most from any price subsidies to input 
foodstuffs. 
Third, an increase in the price of fish would affect low-income households more than 
would any similar increase in the price of either dairy products or meats. An implication, 
for example, is that trade policies which hold down the price of fish could ease 
low-income households' welfare losses caused by increases in the price of rice. 
Finally, the multiple price increase simulation showed that the additional welfare losses 
from multiple price changes were greater for low-income households, in part because 
food represents a greater share of the household budget than do other goods. 
The analysis confirms that different income groups have different consumption pat-
terns, evidenced both by the types of foods consumed (participation rates) and by 
estimated demand parameters and elasticities. If the objectives of the government 
were both to reduce the burden of agricultural subsidies on the fiscal deficit and to 
preserve the welfare levels of the low-income groups, then a number of policy options 
can be suggested: 1) direct transfers to low income households only; (2)smaller 
increases in the price of the type of rice that low-income households consume the most 
(if there exist different qualities of rice and if high-income households have a low 
elasticity of substitution among different types of rice); 3) reduction or elimination of 
direct and indirect price subsidies for meats and dairy products; and finally, 4) no 
increases in the price of fish through, perhaps, favorable trade policies. 
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Summary 
The Government of Indonesia, like many governments in developing countries, has 
intervened in food markets to control and stabilize food prices. And recently, the 
government has had to reduce input and food subsidies due to an increasing fiscal 
deficit. The resulting food price increases have had effects on consumers that differ 
among income groups. This paper develops a theoretically consistent methodology 
to measure changes in different income groups' welfare caused by the adoption of 
alternative food pricing policies. Households were classified based on expenditure 
behavior. We obtained estimates of demand parameters for each income class using 
Indonesian household level expenditure survey data, and evaluated welfare changes 
based on the estimated parameters. The different income groups consumed different 
types of foods and had different demand responses to prices and income. The results 
show the importance of considering distributional effects of policy changes and of 
developing appropriate targeting of food policies. 
Zusammenfassung 
Wie die Regierungen vieler Entwicklungslander, hat die indonesische Regierung auf 
den Nahrungsmittelmarkten interveniert, um Nahrungsmittelpreise zu kontrollieren 
und zu stabilisieren. In letzter Zeit mute die Regierung Faktor- und Nahrungsmittel-
subventionen aufgrund des zunehmenden Haushaltsdefizit reduzieren. Die sich 
ergebenden Nahrungsmittelpreiserhohungen haben Auswirkungen auf die Verbrau-
cher, die sich nach Einkommensklasse unterscheiden. Dieser Artikel entwickelt eine 
theoretisch konsistente Methodik, um Wohlfahrtsveranderungen verschiedener Ein-
kommensgruppen zu messen, die durch die Eintuhrung alternativer Nahrungsmittel-
preispolitiken verursacht wurden. Haushalte wurden aufgrund ihres Ausgabever-
haltens klassifiziert. Wir verwenden eine Umfrage indonesischer Haushalte, erhalten 
Schatzwerte der Nachfrageparameter tur alle Einkommensgruppen, und bewerten 
Wohlfahrtanderungen basiert auf diesen Parameterschatzungen. Die Verbraucher 
der verschiedenen Einkommensklassen konsumierten unterschiedliche Arlen von 
Lebensmitteln und zeigten unterschiedliche Nachfragereaktionen auf Preis- und Ein-
kommenanderungen . Die Ergebnisse zeigen wie wichtig es isl, da Verteilungseffekte 
bei Politikanderungen berucksichtigt werden und da eine geeignete Zielsetzung tur 
die Ernahrungspolitik entwickelt wird. 
Notes 
1 Helen H. Jensen is a Professor of Economics at Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, USA. 
2Justo Manrique is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Saint Louis University, Madrid Campus, 
Spain. 
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